1. Scope and method
We reconcile three primary supply‑demand series for refined nickel: the International Nickel Study Group (INSG) monthly bulletin, Wood Mackenzie Nickel Market Outlook (April 2025), and the IEA World Energy Outlook 2025 critical‑minerals annex. We restrict all three to Class‑1 refined material (≥ 99.8 % Ni) and restate demand by end‑use: batteries, hydrogen, precision alloys, aerospace, semiconductors, defence.
All three series agree in sign (deficit) and agree to within ±6 % in magnitude for the 2020–2025 backward view. Divergence widens in the 2026–2030 projection, dominated by hydrogen build‑out assumptions (100 GW European target vs 60 GW base case).
2. The deficit curve
Fig. 1 — Class‑1 balance, kt. Negative = deficit. GTX reconciliation of INSG / Wood Mackenzie / IEA.
The 2020 deficit of 668 kt roughly triples by 2030. The widening is not driven by battery demand alone; the hydrogen vertical is the fastest‑growing incremental consumer on a 2025–2030 basis, and precision mesh (EMI + aerospace + REE recovery) contributes another step.
3. The aggregation misread
A "nickel surplus" headline in the financial press typically sums nickel pig iron (NPI, Class‑2, < 35 % Ni) with refined Class‑1. NPI is fungible only with stainless steel. No Class‑1 consumer — battery‑cathode precursor, electrolyser‑mesh producer, aerospace‑wire OEM, semiconductor‑deposition house — can take NPI without a second refining step that approximately doubles the delivered cost and adds 6–12 months of lead time.
The misread is not neutral. It produces downstream policy errors — critical‑materials lists that miss the actual bottleneck, and investor briefings that misprice the supply tightness in strategic sectors.
4. Implications
- Analyst models should treat Class‑1 and Class‑2 as separate commodities.
- Procurement should specify grade (NP1 / NP2) at tender, and chain‑of‑custody at delivery.
- Policy should list Class‑1 nickel as a distinct critical material with its own supply‑deficit monitoring.